The first step in devising a security program for a GA airport is to determine the type and size of threats facing the facility. See Airport Community Watch Program Local controls are normally associated with access to airports and airport ifao areas. Once the risk assessment has been completed measures to mitigate those threats can be devised through policy, procedural and physical security precautions.
Further, helicopters and amphibious or float-equipped aircraft specialize in off-airport operations. These controls are normally applied sparingly to small areas to protect only the most important ground activities; enforcement of restrictions associated with large or numerous restricted areas is difficult. The findings of these studies indicate that due to the numerous and successively dependent steps required to kcao various unauthorized activities, the resulting probabilities were quite low.
When the name general aviation is mentioned most members of the public conjure up a mental image of a small, single-engine piston-powered aircraft, operating out of a small rural aerodrome for recreation. Aircraft with unusual or unauthorized modifications. GA airports may be as small as a meter grass runway and have no based aircraft, hangars, buildings or other infrastructure. The findings of these studies indicate that due to the numerous and successively dependent steps required to accomplish various unauthorized activities, the resulting probabilities were quite low.
The diverse size and configuration of GA airports makes the establishment of a single set of security precautions difficult. The Facilitation Section of Aviation Security and Facilitation is responsible for the management of three interrelated programmes:. In addition, the EOC should be: a b 5.
Contingency arrangements for advising telephone authorities must be made in advance. Links will be required between the forward control point and personnel deployed within the inner cordon. Links are also required with the EOC. Radio is probably the only system that gives the required degree of flexibility, but it must be remembered that radio transmissions may be overheard by the perpetrators, the press and others unless encryption or secure transmission methods are used.
At the EOC, good internal communications are required and there should be secure communication links to the government control centre, police headquarters, emergency services, airport authorities, the control tower and the aircraft operator concerned.
The cellular or mobile phone service provider should be requested to arrange for immobilization of all nonessential cellular or mobile telephones within the area of the incident. It is important that the media are dealt with fairly but firmly to ensure that they do not publish information which might pre-empt action planned or being taken by the security forces.
Control of information about the situation is paramount as, in the past, police and aircraft radio communications have been intercepted and rebroadcast as news items over the public networks.
Camera teams have also been known to infiltrate the incident area and film operations. This can dangerously heighten the tension among the perpetrators while premature disclosure of information regarding operations can frustrate tactical plans.
If the media are denied all information they will become frustrated and. They will instead pursue information by all means and, intentionally or not, reduce the possibility of a peaceful solution. An initial agreement with the media should be made to have regular press briefings in a dedicated press room for example, every hour or second hour so that only official and safe information will be communicated by the media officer selected by the police and the CMT.
In addition, press releases should be approved by the Chief of CMT before being disseminated. In particular publicity should be minimized about the actual methods and planning used by the offenders and the security measures applied by States to prevent acts of unlawful interference. A Telephone and Information Centre TIC will need to be set up, which need not be necessarily at the incident site, with a dedicated telephone number, and trained staff, to cope with the high volume of calls from public, relatives and friends of persons involved.
Incoming overseas calls in different languages should be expected. As relatives and friends might provide useful information for the resolution of the crisis name, age, nationality, physionomy, health condition, etc. All information provided by the TIC to the public, relatives and friends should be closely coordinated with the CMT and the media officer. The relatives and friends present at the airport of the incident should be isolated from the rest of the 6 public in a Rest and Debriefing Centre RDC.
The main functions of the RDC are to assist relatives and friends during a very difficult period, remove the pressure of dealing with stressful persons from the entities directly involved in the resolution of the incident and also collect additional information on the persons involved or victims of the crisis. CMT might decide to conduct further interviews of relatives and friends for confirmation and intelligence purposes. In the case of injuries or casualties, the information collected by TIC and RDC on relatives and friends is of paramount importance for police.
Bomb assessors must be appointed and appropriately trained in order that they can assess the threat and give guidance as to what security measures are considered appropriate to counter the threat received. Each threat should be thoroughly investigated and reported immediately to safeguard the public. Appropriate individuals should be familiar with a specific reporting format, an example of which is shown in Appendix 4 Action by the recipient of a bomb threat telephone call.
Positive Target Identification 5. The methodology was designed to lead a bomb assessor to a logical conclusion. PTI will assist in classifying the threat as: a b c specific; non-specific; or hoax. The more information given by the caller most threats are made anonymously over the telephone , the more likely the threat should be taken seriously.
Action by flight crew 5. However, serious consideration should be given to the consequences which may occur as a result of any action being taken by ATS or other authorities of a State that is contrary to the requests of the pilot-in-command.
In addition, the pilot-in-command shall have command over all crew members including any security guards. If the pilot-in-command is unable to do so, another qualified member of the crew should assume command, in accordance with the sequence provided for in the operators manual. All crew members under direction of the commander shall assist that officer in every way. Crew members should therefore: a b refrain from unnecessary conversation or actions which may irritate the individual; exercise due care to ensure that the passengers do not become excited or, in an attempt to overcome the individual, resort to action which may jeopardize safety.
One practicable measure to restrain passengers would be to instruct them to fasten their seat belts; and terminate the serving of alcoholic beverages. Once the unlawful seizure has commenced, an attempt should be made to dissuade the offenders from entering the flight crew compartment. It is therefore desirable that the flight crew be supplied with a condensed set of valid emergency navigation material for possible diversionary landing locations that are not on the scheduled route.
Additional guidelines on crew actions in the case of an act of unlawful interference can be found in the Manual on the Implementation of the Security Provisions of Annex 6 Doc Restricted. Bomb threats on the ground 5. Searching procedures 5. A search plan and checklist should be available on each aircraft. The checklist should be developed by the aircraft operators engineering department. Different checklists should exist for each different type of aircraft and cabin configuration.
In-flight aircraft search procedures 5. Aircraft operators should develop an aircraft search procedure checklist for each type of aircraft in service and include this checklist as part of the flight crew security kit. Refer to Appendix 7 Aircraft security search checklist for assistance in this process. A training programme should be established and maintained for all flight and cabin crew members. Attention should be given to those areas to which passengers have had access, such as main cabins, galley areas and toilets but searches should also include the flight deck or any lower cabin compartment accessible in flight.
Areas to be searched should include all quick-latch or easy access doors. Equipment areas should be searched carefully as there is the possibility that a bomb may be hidden in, behind or under equipment. It may not be necessary to search some areas if a door, compartment or piece of equipment is properly sealed or secured and there is no evidence of tampering. Search teams should be briefed to look for unidentified objects or anything: a b c that should not be there; that cannot be accounted for; and that is out of place.
Evacuation procedures 5. In single or two-storey buildings, evacuation can be executed with relative ease; however, in a building with more than three floors, evacuation should usually be limited to the immediate area where the suspicious article or substance is found, or the area that is specifically identified in the threat and the equivalent space on the floors immediately above and below.
Operators should establish similar procedures for their own buildings. The following factors should be taken into account:. Further information on evacuation procedures is shown in Appendix 9 Search and evacuation guidelines. Evacuation of air traffic services 5. Such procedures would basically be the same as those to be applied in cases of inactivation of ATS units due to fire, natural disasters or complete breakdown of essential communication facilities.
The procedures should take account of the location and staffing of the ATS units, the amount and type of traffic handled, any alternative means available for ensuring continued provision of air traffic services and the available communication facilities. In such cases, it is important that the procedures provide for a reduction of the ATS staff. Depending on the nature and severity of the occurrence, written reports from participants may be desirable.
In any event, all persons involved should report on their roles, the problems and successes encountered, relationships with others involved, effectiveness of communications and observations on the need for amendment or revision of the specific contingency plan or the security programme. Any action a State deems necessary to correct a deficiency is to be notified to ICAO at the earliest opportunity. The purpose of this critique is to share the experience with those who were not directly involved so that they will benefit from it and be better prepared to respond to future occurrences in which they may be involved.
States should, whenever appropriate, furnish copies of reports prepared for ICAO to other States which may have an interest. It is also used to develop additional guidance material for inclusion in this manual and other appropriate ICAO documents. It is therefore logical to expect the continued development of new patterns covering a wider range of unlawful acts.
These reports should be fully analysed by the State, appropriate conclusions drawn and. While public knowledge of such matters is undesirable, it is essential that all airports which are liable to experience similar occurrences, particularly those in adjacent States, be informed as soon as is possible.
Such action will facilitate the early development and implementation of effective countermeasures and procedures. A complete final report often involves considerable investigation, and its completion may not be possible before the lapse of several weeks after the incident occurs.
Therefore, in order that ICAO may keep abreast of changing patterns, the following reports are requested: a a preliminary report on an act of unlawful interference, to be prepared and forwarded as soon as possible by the State of Registry Appendix 10 ; and a final report on an act of unlawful interference, to be prepared and forwarded upon completion of investigations not the judicial procedures by States Appendix The reports have been designed to accommodate any act of unlawful interference as follows: a b c act of unlawful seizure of an aircraft; attempted act of unlawful seizure of an aircraft; unlawful act against the safety of civil aviation including acts of sabotage, malicious damage, bombs and other explosive devices and substances found on airports, aircraft or in airmail, air cargo, baggage ; attempted unlawful act against the safety of civil aviation; any other act of unlawful interference including armed attacks at airports and other unlawful acts directed toward off-airport personnel, facilities, vehicles and other acts which have the potential to develop into a threat to international civil aviation and its facilities ; and other acts not specified above.
Timescales for reports 6. Should immediate remedial action be required, appropriate States and ICAO should be provided with the pertinent details as soon as the information is known and by the most suitable and quickest means available. Such action should not be deferred until completion of the final report. The purpose is to ensure that all pertinent information concerning an aircraft which is being subjected to an act of unlawful interference is available to those States likely to be affected by the flight so that timely and appropriate decisions and action may be taken to safeguard the passengers and crew members, the aircraft, all other civil aircraft in its vicinity, and others likely to be affected by that aircrafts operations.
The sources from which the information may be obtained and the offices or officials who might require it are tabulated in Attachment A to this appendix. A number of variable factors will determine whether or not the required information is available from the operator, ATS units or the security services.
It is not desirable to assign responsibility for compilation and dissemination of all the information required for security purposes to a non-governmental entity such as the operator who may not always have a representative available at the airports where the aircraft has landed or is likely to land.
Further, assignment to ATS units of this responsibility for compiling non-ATS information, at a time when ATS units may be carrying a maximum workload, will be undesirable. It is therefore recommended that primary responsibility for the compilation and dissemination of the information required for security purposes be assigned to a designated security service.
However, ATS units and the operator should be required to assist, to the extent feasible, in compilation of the required information. Assignment of responsibility at this level and in the following manner would be appropriate: a b the operator: to provide all available pertinent details that are not contained in the flight plan; ATS units: to provide all ATS information available, assisting, when possible, in obtaining from the pilot such other information as is required; and the designated security service: to collect, compile and collate all of the required information, including specialist advice requested by the pilot-in-command, and to immediately transmit such information by the fastest available means to other security services likely to be affected and to the pilot-in-command when deemed necessary or desirable, at the same time informing the appropriate authority for security of the action taken.
In some cases, it will be desirable to use the operators communications capability as it may be the fastest means available. The urgent nature of each act of unlawful interference makes it necessary for pertinent information to be transmitted immediately as it becomes known and by the quickest means available to permit the timely implementation of plans for safeguarding the affected aircraft and all other aircraft likely to be affected by its operation.
Therefore, the ATS unit which first becomes aware of an aircraft which is being subjected to an act of unlawful interference should transmit an initial alerting message containing all available pertinent information to those ATS units which might be affected having regard to the fuel endurance of the aircraft, the possibility of sudden changes in destination and other relevant factors.
As a parallel action, the security services in the States concerned should transmit all the available pertinent information to the security services at the aircrafts known or suspected destination and to the security services in the States expected to be overflown. The requirements for ATS units to forward information relating to an aircraft which is being subjected to an act of unlawful interference are currently covered by provisions contained in Annex 11 and the PANS-ATM.
Compilation and dissemination of information concerning an aircraft which is being subjected to an act of unlawful interference. If so, the extent of the incapacitation details of those in need of prescription drugs or special medical attention immediately upon landing number, type, etc. Annex 17 Security requires that each Contracting State constantly review the level of threat to civil aviation operations within its territory and adjust relevant elements of its national civil aviation security programme accordingly.
This requirement addresses two concepts threat assessment and risk management which together form the basis of a viable and cost-effective security response to those threats that target civil aviation. One of the most difficult tasks for aviation security professionals is devising an effective security plan that correlates to the threat against civil aviation.
Accurately identifying the threat or threats must be the first step in the process. A methodology on threat assessment has therefore been developed and is described in this appendix. There are multiple benefits to using this methodology. It is versatile enough to assess threats to an aircraft operator, an airport or a State. Secondly, as most organizations have limited human and technological resources, a valid threat assessment can still be made without receiving significant intelligence information or employing a lot of specialized personnel because it uses a quantitative analytical approach.
Furthermore, one of the primary benefits to using this methodology is that it offers a reliable procedure to identify the threat which, in turn, assists security professionals and other decision-makers in optimally allocating funds, acquiring critical security equipment and deploying manpower. This last aspect is part of the risk management concept and is addressed in Appendix 3. It is readily acknowledged that the responsibility for assessing the nature and level of threats to civil aviation within a State may be delegated to another entity, such as an intelligence service or a military component, and not to the Civil Aviation Authority.
This guidance material is therefore provided primarily to assist a Contracting State in meeting its requirement under Annex 17 if it has no other usable threat assessment process for civil aviation. The intention is that the appropriate authority responsible for the threat assessment considers adapting this model as necessary to fit the States particular circumstances.
In devising a threat assessment methodology, it is preferable to use a systematic and quantifiable approach to evaluate what the specific threat or threats may be to an airport, an aircraft operator, or a nation. The structure of this methodological approach therefore employs three core principles of security: identify, implement and sustain. When making a threat assessment, the analyst mainly uses the first principle, identify, while the other two principles play a significant role in the risk management process.
In undertaking the task of assessing the threat to civil aviation, there are several sources of empirical evidence and statistical data available in the fields of intelligence and aviation security from which to form an analysis of past trends of acts of unlawful interference involving international civil aviation. In order to provide decision-makers with a current and credible threat assessment, however, multiple sources of information should be explored.
Because it is often difficult to come across dependable information regarding threats to aviation, the analyst must optimize the sporadic and vague information that is available.
Analysts of this type of information, whether they be trained intelligence A It is important to note that when making the threat analysis, the analyst must also avoid being influenced by institutionalized standards such as those attitudes and habits an organization may perpetuate as established norms which inhibit the thought process.
The analyst should try not to be constrained by traditional methods or processes but should blend traditional thinking with innovative evaluation techniques. The analyst must first determine the threat and vulnerability criteria before conducting the assessment by deciding on focal points or centres of gravity. Centres of gravity can be defined as those factors or criteria that are estimated to have the most weight or value in a given process.
Centres of gravity change according to the system being studied. Examples of systems are a country, an airport, an aircraft operator, or a group of people. This methodological approach can be adapted to any system mentioned above, as long as the process is constructed of quantifiable values ascribed to the chosen centres of gravity. In recognizing that most organizations have limited human and technological resources, a quantitative analytical approach requires less information to form a conclusion.
It also directs the analyst to consider relevant data with objectivity rather than with subjective speculation. This process utilizes two facets of analysis that together form a credible means of assessing the threat and determining a security response through application of risk management measures.
First, it must be understood that a deliberate act of unlawful interference against civil aviation must, by definition, be premeditated and carried out with purpose by the perpetrators. This means that someone has a reason to conduct an unlawful act and thus proceeds to plan and execute the act.
Therefore, before assessing how an act of unlawful interference may be carried out against a target, the analyst should first consider the reasons why an unlawful act would be committed against civil aviation and the probability of its being committed. This premise eliminates the possibility of using this methodology to analyse a threat for any incident where air operations are disrupted by an unruly passenger or mentally unstable individual whose actions cannot be predicted and are spontaneous.
The next step would be to create working tools to assist in the assessment process. The working tool for this methodology has been named a vulnerability matrix. The two vulnerability matrices described in this appendix can be combined to form the final analysis for a follow-on risk management process, or they can be used independent of each other depending on the needs of the analyst.
It should be noted that in order to assess the vulnerabilities of an airport the matrix on aviation security threat categories must be used, at a minimum. For purposes of this guidance material, Vulnerability Matrix No. The second matrix covers aviation security threat categories which can be adapted to assess the threat directed at a potential target such as an airport or to evaluate the aviation security posture of an aircraft operator or of a State see Tables A and A For the vulnerability matrix on profiling a group, one should subscribe to the assumption that most humanbased systems can be organized according to five basic attributes.
Therefore, any group can be defined as having the following components: leadership, system essential, infrastructure, population and a fighting mechanism.
These five. The leadership function includes the groups hierarchy, presence of legitimate political representation and use of charismatic personalities, to name a few examples.
The system essential can be described as the will and means of a group to convert theoretical goals, such as political agendas or religious causes, into practical application through surveillance operations, acquisition of weapons, developing sources of funding and training of operatives.
Infrastructure combines several elements such as the size and number of group cells or sub-units, an established communications network and effective use of transportation and supply lines. The population attribute refers to the existence of an extended support network made up of local sympathizers or others who may provide safe haven, food and money to the group whether in accord with the groups goals, or possibly out of fear and coercion.
The fighting mechanism is the attribute assigned with carrying out the groups actions in pursuit of achieving their goals. These group members can be referred to as warriors, for example hijackers, or technicians, such as bomb-makers.
Under the five attributes mentioned, functional subcategories can be added according to the depth of analysis desired by the analyst. Those subcategories could include factors such as the groups capability to conduct violent action, location and history of known previous activities and level of commitment to its ideological purpose i.
Once the point values assigned to each centre of gravity have been totalled, the bottom line will provide the analyst with a profile of a group and a reliable estimate on the probability capability of the group to conduct an act of unlawful interference against civil aviation. The second vulnerability matrix is based on six threat categories. The matrix can be expanded to include other factors judged to be important to the analyst, but for the purpose of this sample matrix the number of categories has been limited to those most often affecting the aviation security mission.
The categories include the presence of a group which could commit an unlawful act, a history of attacks against civil aviation, existence of internal strife, conditions of economic crisis, the volume of flights and the transit of high-risk flights. These six areas of focus represent different centres of gravity from those of the group profile.
It can be seen that these centres of gravity are better suited to the threat assessment of States, aircraft operators or airports. Once the point values are totalled, the analyst has a quantifiable method of predicting the level of threat for the target being evaluated.
If the sum totals are combined with the totals of a group profile, the result can be directly linked to the application of security countermeasures commensurate to the assessed threat.
It must be emphasized at this point that, as with any analytical method, the benefits of such a process are only valid if the process is undertaken routinely. Prescribed periodic review of current data is essential when evaluating any change to the assessed threat.
Thus, with proper control and management, this methodological approach to a threat assessment will continue to provide aviation security professionals and other decision-makers the means for effective risk management and security response.
In completing the matrices explained in Tables A through A, the analyst should: a b c d first specify the criteria to be assessed; fill in the columns according to the point values given for both matrices; add up the total points in each row or column as appropriate; and assign priorities for countermeasures in order of point value with the greater number of points equalling a higher level of threat and vulnerability. It may be generally assumed that a thorough explanation incorporating the rationale behind the specified conclusions should accompany any threat assessment.
A well-based explanation justifies the resulting risk management programme that will be devised to counteract the assessed threat or threats to civil aviation. Sample criteria and point values of system attributes for a group profile More questions may be added as necessary.
Is the leadership centralized? Is the leadership unified in its objectives? Does the group have a cause or motive? Does the group make its cause public? Is the group capable enough to take action?
Does the group have a known structure? Is the structure extensive? Is it effective? Does the group receive support from local or foreign government sources? Does the group have local supporters? Are the group members dedicated? Does the group actively recruit members?
Do the members receive operations training? Has the group conducted successful attacks? Each YES answer equals 1 point. Threat assessment methodology Table A Definitions and point values of aviation security threat categories for Vulnerability Matrix No.
Earlier attacks are recorded. This may include any form of violent action, but special attention should be paid to any attacks directed against civil aviation, such as a hijacking, bombing at an airport or aircraft operator ticket office, and other armed attacks in the vicinity of the airport.
ICAO Annex 1 The pilot license, when linked to a government issued identification containing a photograph such as a driving licensewill permit authorized personnel to positively identify pilot personnel. Manusl enable scripts and reload this page.
Where assessments indicate higher risk levels devices to immobilize the aircraft may be warranted. This website uses cookies to improve your experience while you navigate through the website. Out of these cookies, the cookies that are categorized as necessary are stored on your browser as they are as essential for the working of basic functionalities of the website.
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These cookies do not store any personal information. Previous Story Next Story. Once the level of risk has been determined mitigating factors can be devised to counter the threat. Because of this diversity a single security lcao is inappropriate for all GA airports. ICAO Annex 1 The pilot license, when linked to a government issued identification containing a photograph such as a driving licensewill permit authorized personnel to positively identify pilot personnel. Include appropriate emergency phone numbers on the sign.
Policy work is focused primarily on maintaining the currency of Annex 17 and related guidance material such as Doca significant challenge considering the evolving nature of the threat. Turn on more accessible mode. Without this activity essential transportation functions would be eliminated and the opportunities associated with them would be lost to the economies they potentially serve.
Hold iicao meetings with the airport community. Additionally, specialty aircraft such as those used for agricultural application and insect control are of concern because of their potential for dispensing harmful aerosols. Examples of these measures ica These recommendations are not all-inclusive. Yet, existing controls imposed at these airports to deter theft and vandalism are normally adequate to prevent misuse of the aircraft.
What is the probability of the action being accomplished? Size and capability of dic or transient aircraft will help determine relative threat, as well.
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